

1510 F23
Lachha

Turing-Completeness

Recall last time we gave a ~~formal~~ definition of the Church-Turing Thesis, which is an ^{correspondence} association between the informal, intuitive notion of an algorithm, and the formal definition of a Turing machine. The simple, humble Turing-machine is the sytreme.

$$(CTT: \exists C \mathcal{L}(TM) \subseteq \mathcal{L}(C).$$

$$\forall C \mathcal{L}(C) \subseteq \mathcal{L}(TM)$$

where C is a realizable model of computation. A model of computation is said to be Turing-complete (or Turing equivalent) if $\mathcal{L}(TM) \subseteq \mathcal{L}(C)$.

If you can simulate a Turing machine on that computational model.

By the Church-Turing-Thesis, we get $\mathcal{L}(C) \subseteq \mathcal{L}(TM)$ for free, so to prove $\mathcal{L}(C) = \mathcal{L}(TM)$, you need only to prove that $\mathcal{L}(TM) \subseteq \mathcal{L}(C)$. It could ~~only~~ be the case then that $\mathcal{L}(TM) = \mathcal{L}(C)$.

Let's consider the four models from last time. $stayTM$, $2wayTM$, kTM , NTM . These were all defined as generalizations of the Turing machine, so for each one, we got ~~for~~ for free that $\mathcal{L}(TM) \subseteq \mathcal{L}(stayTM)$, and then we proved that $\mathcal{L}(stayTM) \subseteq \mathcal{L}(TM)$.

Let's prove python, an ideal programming language is Turing-complete. First, as a computational model, what is python? It is only a notation, to abstract us away from the hardware. It is Turing-complete as you could write a Turing machine simulator in python relatively easily, so obviously $\mathcal{L}(TM) \subseteq \mathcal{L}(PY)$. Any language you could write a Turing machine simulator in is Turing complete.

we exercised the CTT in two ways here. First, we didn't have to prove $\mathcal{L}(PY) \subseteq \mathcal{L}(TM)$. A python simulator is a Turing machine, yikes! Second, to prove $\mathcal{L}(TM) \subseteq \mathcal{L}(PY)$, we never actually gave the python program! Just supposed that we could. The CTT allows you to conceptualize an algorithm, and then just the fact you could implement it if you had to is enough to argue about the existence of a program for some tasks. To what level, you will formalize this on the next homework.


Recall the kinds of grammars we have seen so far

regular grammar $V \rightarrow \Sigma^* V \mid \Sigma \mid \epsilon$ $A \rightarrow aA$
 context-free $V \rightarrow (V \cup \Sigma)^*$ $A \rightarrow bCdE...$
 context-sensitive $aVb \rightarrow a(V \cup \Sigma)^* b, q, b \in (V \cup \Sigma)^* aAa \rightarrow aBa$

each one defined a class of languages greater than the previous one. The relaxed and generalized the kinds of productions allowed, we gained power to produce more and more languages. What about an unrestricted grammar?

Unrestricted grammar $(V \cup \Sigma)^* \rightarrow (V \cup \Sigma)^*$

we prove $\mathcal{L}(TM) \subseteq \mathcal{L}(UG)$. Unrestricted grammars are Turing-complete.
 we first investigate a Turing-machine computation.



q_0 abaaaaaa
 q_0 baaaaaa
 q_0 aaaaaaa
 q_0 baaaaaa
 q_0 aaaaaaa
 q_0 baaaaaa

observe that computation is local. for each configuration, only a constant amount of it is changed from step to step. we can easily simulate each configuration as a working string in a grammar, for states $\{q_0 \dots q_n\}$, add states $\{S, Q_0, \dots, Q_n, A, B, \perp\}$

for transition $q_i \xrightarrow{a \rightarrow b, R} q_j$ add production $Q_i a \rightarrow b Q_j$
 for transition $q_i \xrightarrow{a \rightarrow b, L} q_j$ add productions $a Q_i a \rightarrow Q_j a b$
 $b Q_i a \rightarrow Q_j b b$

great! But we need to begin on the input. $\perp Q_i a \rightarrow Q_j \perp b$
 A grammar nondeterministically produces all correct strings. But a Turing machine begins on input. we just nondeterministically simulate the TM on all inputs.

$S \Rightarrow QAB$ $A \Rightarrow aA/bA/\epsilon$, $B \Rightarrow \sqcup B/\epsilon$.
 so $S \Rightarrow q_0 \Sigma^* \sqcup^*$ basically. If we need more blanks, B can produce more for us.

Now how do we terminate? we make our single halting state clean up the output for us. A real Turing machine would loop left and right to destroy stuff, so we simulate it doing the same

$$\begin{array}{ll} aQ_h \Rightarrow Q_h a & Q_h a \Rightarrow aQ_h \\ bQ_h \Rightarrow Q_h b & Q_h b \Rightarrow bQ_h \\ Q_h \sqcup \Rightarrow Q_h & \cancel{Q_h \sqcup} Q_h \Rightarrow Q_h \end{array}$$

unnecessary, but it's fine. then we remove the state, $Q_h \Rightarrow \epsilon$ with no more nonterminals; we end with a produced string.

could also pretend $\sqcup$ is a nonterminal and add $\sqcup \Rightarrow \epsilon$.
 from this we conclude $\mathcal{L}(TM) \in \mathcal{L}(UG)$. It also is an interesting characterization of the power of Grammars

$$\mathcal{L}(RG) \Big) \mathcal{L}(CFG) \Big) \mathcal{L}(CSG) \Big) \mathcal{L}(UG) \Big)$$


by the Church-Turing Thesis, there is no grammar greater than an unrestricted one.

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lets go back and consider the PDA. Certainly one ~~PDA~~ stack is greater than no stack. what about two stacks? Define a 2PDA with transition function like $\delta: Q \times \Gamma \times \Gamma \times \Sigma \rightarrow (Q \times \Gamma \times \Gamma)$. It can read from the input, pop from both stacks and push to ~~both~~ both stacks simultaneously.

we prove $\mathcal{L}(TM) \in \mathcal{L}(2PDA)$. Two stacks is Turing complete.

Here's the visual proof:



point the stacks at each other to get a 2 way tape!

from $a \rightarrow b, R$ $\boxed{xy} \boxed{az} \rightarrow \boxed{xyb} \boxed{z}$
 pop a from stack 2, push b to stack 1.


for $a \rightarrow b, L$ $\boxed{xy} \boxed{az} \rightarrow \boxed{x} \boxed{y b z}$
 pop a from stack 2, push b ^{to} stack 2, pop symbol from stack 1 and push it to stack 2. I will leave it to you to fill in the details. This also gives us an interesting hierarchy in terms of the number of stacks.

$$\mathcal{L}(OPDA) \supset \mathcal{L}(IPDA) \supset \mathcal{L}(2PDA)$$

By the Church-Turing Thesis, 'two stacks is enough.' $\mathcal{L}(3PDA) \subseteq \mathcal{L}(2PDA)$
 Any more than two stacks does not give you more power.
 Just like more than one tape doesn't give more power.

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For any of these systems, unbounded memory is important. We prove a Turing machine with finite (work) tape is not Turing-complete.



Such a device is in fact regular! If there is finite tape, there is also only a finite amount of configurations. To each configuration assign a state and define δ appropriately. This is simply a DFA.

$q_0 aba \rightarrow bq_0 ba$ do $(q_0 aba) \xrightarrow{a} (bq_0 aba)$

Essentially, if you have finite space, you fit it all into the registers. I see this argument a lot in favour of why no real computer is Turing complete. This is fallacious. A Turing machine doesn't have infinite memory in any usable sense. ~~It is~~ Any computation which halts can only use as much tape as the number of steps. So any computation we care about has some space bound.

Do not think of the tape as part of the machine, no more than a road is part of a car. The tape is nature, the environment, the earth, the universe. We do not exist and "do" on earth in any way limited by the size of the planet. In fact, this is a good marker to test if any kind of system is Turing-complete.

Defn:

A computation is a process which realises in environment via repeated applications of a set of rules.

Other examples of Turing complete systems include broken circuits, Conway's game of life, most programming languages, Minecraft redstone, and much more.

